No options. No leverage. No complicated merger spread. No obscure derivative.

Just a listed European small cap, a corporate action, and a temporary gap between the market price and the price the company itself has formally committed to paying for its own shares.

The interesting part? This setup only exists for retail investors!

At the current market price, the opportunity would amount to roughly €250 profit on an investment of €1500 over a period of less than 2 weeks.

There is a deadline.
There are tax considerations.
Broker handling matters.
And because of that, this is not risk-free.

But the setup is so simple that you’ll ask yourself why this arbitrage opportunity still exists.

The company name, ticker and full mechanics are below for subscribers.

This is a nobrainer. I’m essentially giving you €250 for free.

The Company

The company is Aumann AG, a German small-cap listed in Frankfurt.

Ticker / ISIN: Aumann AG — DE000A2DAM03

Aumann is a German machine builder focused on automation solutions, including production lines for electric drivetrains and other industrial applications. It is not a hype stock. It is not a meme stock. It is a small, somewhat overlooked industrial business with a very strong balance sheet.

It has a market cap of €200 million and €144 million net cash and an EV/EBITDA of only 2x!

That strong balance sheet is exactly why this situation exists.

The company has decided to return part of its gigantic net cash position to shareholders through a voluntary public share buyback offer.

The Tender Offer

On June 5th Aumann launched a tender offer to buy back up to 1,291,704 shares, equal to around 10% of the share capital, at €16.50 per share. The share price at that time was €14.

But on 22 June 2026, the company improved the offer ‘to increase the attractiveness of the Buyback in light of the significant share price development following the publication of the initial offer’, said the CFO.

The new tender price is €17.80 per share

All other terms of the offer remain unchanged. That is a key point.

Aumann is now offering to buy back shares at €17.80, while the market price has been trading materially below that level.

At a market price of around €14.80, the spread is:

€17.80 - €15.30 = €2.50 per share

For 100 shares, that equals:

100 × €2.50 = €250 profit

Again: gross. Taxes, broker fees, execution and tender handling matter.

But mechanically, this is the setup.

Why Smaller Shareholders May Have an Edge

The offer document contains an important clause.

If more shares are tendered than Aumann wants to buy back, acceptances will generally be scaled down pro rata.

However, Aumann states that it makes use of the option to give preferential acceptance to small quantities of up to 100 shares.

In plain English: small shareholders tendering up to 100 shares appear to have priority.

That is what makes this interesting.

For a large institutional investor, this kind of opportunity is too small to matter. For a private investor, however, a few hundred euros of potential gross profit from a simple corporate action can be meaningful — especially if the mechanics are straightforward.

History Repeats Itself?

Importantly, this is not the first time Aumann has done this.

Last year, the company launched a very similar public share buyback offer. Back then, Aumann offered to buy back up to 1,434,523 shares, also representing around 10% of the share capital, at an offer price of €12.37 per share.

The result was striking.

Shareholders tendered 9,956,853 shares into the offer, or 69% of all shares outstanding!

That means almost 7 times as many shares were tendered as Aumann actually wanted to buy back.

Because the offer was heavily oversubscribed, Aumann applied the allocation mechanism from the offer document. Small quantities of up to 100 shares were given preferential treatment, while the remaining tendered shares were accepted pro rata.

The final allocation rate for the other shares was only around 13.77%.

In the end, Aumann repurchased 1,434,244 shares, corresponding to exactly 10.00% of the company’s share capital.

Why does this matter?

Because it shows two things.

First, Aumann has used this exact type of tender mechanism before.

Second, last year’s offer was massively oversubscribed — yet small shareholders were explicitly protected through the preferential treatment clause.

That historical precedent makes the current setup more interesting.

Of course, every offer needs to be assessed on its own terms. But this is not some theoretical corporate-action mechanic that has never been tested. Aumann has done this before, and the outcome gives us a useful reference point.

Why Does This Opportunity Exist?

There are several possible reasons.

First, small-cap corporate actions are often ignored. Many investors simply do not read offer documents.

Second, the opportunity size is too small for institutional investors. Even if the spread is attractive, the 100-share angle limits scalability. Offered positions of larger than 100 shares will only see 10-15% of their offered shares bought, just like last year.

Third, tax treatment can be messy. In some countries, a tender into a share buyback may be treated like an ordinary sale. In others, it can have dividend-like tax consequences. This uncertainty alone can keep many investors away.

Fourth, brokers do not always process voluntary corporate actions smoothly. Some investors may not know how to tender. Others may not have access. Some may not bother.

That is exactly why these small, weird situations can exist.

The Main Risks

This is not a guaranteed free lunch.

The main risks are:

1. Tender execution risk
You need to correctly instruct your broker to participate in the buyback offer before the deadline.

2. Broker processing risk
Different brokers may handle voluntary corporate actions differently. Some may charge fees. Some may have earlier internal deadlines.

3. Tax risk
This is the big one. Tax treatment may differ by country. For some investors, there may be a risk that the transaction is treated as a dividend-like event if the repurchased shares are later cancelled. This could materially reduce or even eliminate the economic benefit.

4. Market risk
If you buy the shares and fail to tender them correctly, you remain exposed to the share price.

My View

This is a rare and unusually simple small-cap arbitrage setup.

The company itself is offering €17.80 per share.

The market price has been significantly below that level.

Small shareholders appear to have a structural advantage for up to 100 shares.

That creates a potential gross profit of roughly €250 on 100 shares if bought around €15.30 and successfully tendered at €17.80.

The opportunity is not scalable. It is not risk-free. And tax treatment matters a lot.

But that is precisely why it is interesting.

This is the kind of small, overlooked corporate-action setup that larger investors usually ignore — and where attentive private investors may have an edge.

What I Would Do Before Acting

Before participating, I would:

1. Read the official Aumann offer document.

2. Ask my broker:

   1. whether I can participate in the tender

   2. about the broker’s internal deadline

   3. whether any German withholding tax will be applied (this houldn’t be the case)

   4. check the domestic tax treatment in my own country (normally this buyback shouldn’t be taxed since management hasn’t decided yet what the’re going to do with these treasury shares)

3. Make sure I understand what happens if more shares are tendered than Aumann wants to buy back.

Only after that would I consider acting.

Bottom Line

Aumann AG has created a rare corporate-action arbitrage opportunity.

At the improved tender price of €17.80, smaller investors may be able to capture a meaningful spread on up to 100 shares.

At a market price around €15.30, that spread is €250.

For a professional fund, that is irrelevant.

For a small private investor, it is worth a look.

Not financial advice. Do your own work. Taxes and broker treatment may matter.

In September 2022, I bought shares of Heijmans NV – a Dutch construction and real estate development company – at €10.44. In February the stock shot up another 30% in just a few days after publication of the Full Years Results of 2025. I sold a few days later on February 18 at a price of €90.60, delivering an incredible 906% total return (approximately 96% CAGR) in just three years! Measured in US dollars the return is even higher: 1073% or 105% CAGR! This is not too far from Nvidia’s 984% return during the same time period.

Such a dramatic gain is every deep value investor’s dream. Now, with the stock fully rerated and a large part of the opportunity realized, I’ve decided to sell my shares to lock in profits.

In this article, I’ll explain why Heijmans was so mispriced back then, what has changed since, and why it’s prudent to rebalance after this huge win.

2022: An Extraordinary Deep Value Opportunity

When I initiated the Heijmans position in August 2022, the valuation was absurdly low. The company’s market cap was only about €225 million – less than the €317 million book value of its equity at the time. In other words, Mr. Market was pricing Heijmans at roughly 0.7× book value. Meanwhile, Heijmans had earned around €65 million in net profit over the prior four quarters, putting the P/E at 3.5. A profitable, asset-rich business trading for pennies on the dollar – this was deep value in its purest form.

Why so cheap? In 2022, sentiment toward construction stocks was poor. The sector is cyclical, and the Dutch market faced nitrogen regulation issues, housing policy shifts, and macro headwinds. Rent controls and policy uncertainty scared investors. Add the small-cap status, and Heijmans was simply ignored.

What Changed? From Mispricing to Massive Outperformance

Over the next three years, Heijmans executed superbly. Revenue rose to €2.8 billion in 2025, with EBITDA growing to €183 million (6.7% margin) and net profit hitting €130 million. In just one year the company earned almost 60% of the market cap when I first bought in.

Management emphasized “margin over volume”, and it paid off. In 2025, EBITDA margin rose to 6.6%, approaching their 2027 target. Return on capital employed hit 24%, driven by strong execution and an improved project mix.

Strategic acquisitions like Van Wanrooij and Van Gisbergen expanded the land bank and added prefab housing capabilities. Heijmans now has a housing pipeline of 37,000 units, offering scale and visibility.

The balance sheet remains robust: net debt is minimal, solvency is healthy, and cash generation supports both dividends and growth initiatives.

Tailwinds: Housing Crisis, Politics, and Modular Construction

The Dutch housing shortage remains one of the country’s biggest challenges. All major political parties acknowledge the urgency of building more affordable homes. Affordable housing was even declared as the central theme of the Dutch elections in October last year.

Heijmans is ideally positioned to deliver. Their focus on modular construction and integrated area development gives them an edge in cost efficiency and execution speed.

The company also stands to benefit from increasing investment in infrastructure, driven by energy transition, mobility, and climate resilience. The order book of approximately €3.0 billion reflects these secular tailwinds.

That said, political uncertainty still looms. Permitting remains slow, and recent cabinet collapses have added noise to housing policy timelines. Some of this optimism may now be priced in.

Time to Rebalance: Locking In Gains

At €90.60, Heijmans no longer traded at distressed multiples. The P/E had increased to 19× trailing earnings and 15× forward earnings. The EV/Gross profit had normalized from 0.6 to 5.5. That’s reasonable for a quality compounder, but the deep value gap had closed.

Given this, I’ve sold my last shares. Heijmans went from an overlooked cyclical to a national champion. That kind of rerating doesn’t happen often. And after a, 1073% dollar return, it’s time to celebrate — and reallocate. There’s plenty of other fish in the sea.

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— Deep Value Stocks

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Every now and then, you stumble upon a company that seems priced for trouble — yet the numbers tell the opposite story.

Nomad Foods (NOMD) is one of those rare cases.

At a forward P/E of 5.7, EV/EBITDA of 6.7, and EV/sales of 1.1, the market is valuing Europe’s frozen food champion like a struggling cyclical. In reality, Nomad is a stable, cash-generating machine with strong brands, predictable earnings, and shareholder-friendly capital allocation.

A quiet empire built on frozen food

At the heart of Nomad’s business lies something simple: frozen meals, fish, and vegetables. The company owns iconic brands like Iglo, Birds Eye, and Findus — household names across Europe.

Through scale, logistics, and brand loyalty, Nomad has become the undisputed market leader in Europe’s frozen food segment.

This is a market that’s growing structurally — not shrinking — thanks to:

• Sustainability, as frozen food reduces waste and extends shelf life,

• Convenience, for consumers balancing work and affordability,

• Consistent quality, enabled by large-scale production and distribution.

The result is a steady business with high visibility, even in turbulent economic times.

Predictable cash, year after year

Unlike most “cheap” stocks, Nomad’s fundamentals are boring in the best possible way. Revenue barely moves — and that’s the point. It’s reliably stable.

Operating margins hover around 15%, and free cash flow remains strong across cycles.
This consistency gives management the confidence to aggressively return capital to shareholders.

Quietly shrinking the share count

Nomad Foods is one of Europe’s most shareholder-friendly consumer staples.

In the past twelve months alone, the company repurchased 9% of its shares outstanding — a buyback yield of 9% — and paid a dividend yield of 7.0%.

Combined, that’s a total shareholder yield of 16%.

Since 2021, the total share count has fallen from 173.6 million to 142.4 million — an 18% reduction. Every remaining share now represents a larger slice of the company’s steady earnings base.

That’s how deep value quietly compounds: one buyback at a time.

The absurdly low multiple

At six times earnings, investors are paying less for Nomad Foods than for many cyclical or commodity businesses — even though this one sells branded consumer staples with stable demand.

A 5.7× P/E, 6.7× EV/EBITDA and 1.1× EV/sales valuation would make sense if the business were shrinking. It’s not.

And to make things even more absurd — the stock also trades at just 0.6× book value.

Nomad continues to generate steady growth, strong cash flow, and consistent returns, year after year.

The disconnect between price and fundamentals here is striking.

What the market is missing

Markets love growth stories and flashy narratives. But Nomad doesn’t fit into any of them. It’s too stable for growth investors, too boring for momentum traders, and too small for the big consumer-staples funds dominated by Nestlé and Unilever.

That’s why the valuation has quietly drifted lower — not because the business has deteriorated, but because nobody’s paying attention.

For patient investors, that indifference is the opportunity.

The bottom line

Nomad Foods is everything you’d want in a deep value stock:

• A stable, essential business with strong brands,

• Predictable cash generation,

• A massive buyback program quietly reducing the float,

• A combined shareholder yield of 15%,

• And a single-digit earnings multiple that borders on absurd.

At 5.7× forward earnings, you’re not just buying cheap — you’re buying quality at a discount.

This isn’t a turnaround story. It’s a cash machine trading like a troubled asset.

The kind of setup that, sooner or later, forces the market to reprice it upward.

— Deep Value Stocks

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TUI AG is one of the largest tourism groups in the world: airlines, cruise ships, hotels, packaged holidays, destination experiences. This is not an asset-light website business. This is hard infrastructure scale.

And yet the stock trades like the recovery never happened.

This is exactly where deep value gets interesting: when the fundamentals already recovered… but the valuation is still stuck in the past.

The Business Isn’t Broken — The Market Narrative Is

After the pandemic, TUI had scars. Bailout. Dilution. Headlines. Everyone remembers that part of the story. But the punchline is this: that part is over. Today, the business is running normally. They are not fighting for survival anymore — they are optimizing for margin and profitable growth again.

Forward valuation:

• ~5.7x forward earnings

• ~5.4x forward FCF

• ~2.8x forward EV / EBITDA

You normally see these multiples on companies close to liquidation or slow structural terminal decline.

Not on a global tourism machine that is printing profits and paying down debt.

That is the core irrationality here.

The Recovery Is Visible In The Numbers

Q2 2025 revenue: €3.7 billion (+1.5% YoY) despite Easter shifting into Q3.
Underlying EBIT: €207 million.
Management reaffirmed FY EBIT growth of 7-10%.

Across Europe, travelers are booking earlier, paying more, and prioritizing experiences. This is not “revenge travel hype” anymore. This is sticky behavior evolution. People are now structurally allocating a larger portion of discretionary money to travel.

Hotels are full. Cruises posted record revenue last summer. Airlines are running very high load factors with mid-90% ranges across key routes. This is not a small marginal bump. This is normalized demand + pricing power returning.

The operating model works again. Revenue has recovered and already surpassed the pre Covid levels.

Gross Profit and Operating Income have recoverd as well. Net Income is still lagging behind due to interest expenses. These interest expenses will decline as TUI is paying of its debts.

Why This Business Model Has More Embedded Quality Than Most Realize

TUI is not a middleman.
TUI owns supply.

That matters more than people think.

When travel demand rebounds, OTAs do not get margin leverage. TUI does. A hotel operator that fills more rooms with fixed costs covered expands margin significantly more than an OTA collecting 14% commission.

This is the hidden quality factor that screens miss.

On top of that:

Dynamic Packaging → capital-light ticket capture using 3rd party hotels/flights.
App funnel → lower CAC, higher attachment, direct & recurring.
Scale → bargaining power with suppliers + cost spread over massive volume.

The integrated structure + digital conversion is a flywheel.
The more volume flows through TUI’s system → the more value they capture per traveler.

The Market is Emotionally Mispricing This (classic behavioural deep value)

TUI is punished for its past.
Not for its present.

Investors are still anchored to rescue headlines. They remember TUI as “European tourism zombie bailout case.” Humans overweight pain. They overweight prior trauma. They underweight normalization.

Markets lag reality longer than people think.

This is why deep value works: not because analysts can forecast the future better — but because the market chronically misprices when narrative regime shifts have already happened on the ground.

Risks Exist — Of Course They Do — But They Are Already Embedded In Price

Travel is seasonal.
Fuel is volatile.
Europe macro is not risk-free.
Geopolitical shocks can hit out of nowhere.

Yes, that’s real.

But if this stock was 18x forward earnings → then these risks are thesis-breakers.

At under 6x earnings and under 3x EV/EBITDA → they are expected.

This is not “what if risk happens?”
This is “the market is already pricing that everything goes wrong forever.”

That’s the asymmetry.

What A Reasonable Re-Rating Could Look Like

If TUI simply goes back to normal sector range multiples, not premium luxury valuation — just boring base case normalization — the equity outcome changes meaningfully.

Moving from ~5.7x forward earnings to something closer to 10x is not aggressive. Sector comps support it. History supports it.

EV/EBITDA is even more extreme: ~2.8x vs sector norms ~6-8x.

This is not a growth stock thesis. This is a valuation normalization thesis.

TUI does not need to “crush it.”
It just needs to keep operating like it is right now.

Catalysts That Could Force The Market To Wake Up

• official reinstatement of capital return (dividend or buyback) as debt drops further

• continued expansion of dynamic packaging mix → structurally higher margin revenue

• stronger app conversion → a cleaner LT investor narrative around recurring digital funnel

• easing macro in Europe → discretionary demand steadies

• more analyst coverage shifting off “bailout trauma lens” → narrative regime shift

None of these need to be heroic.
Just one or two is usually enough to kick the multiple into the right bracket.

Bottom Line

TUI is a global, asset-heavy travel empire with real structural advantages, improving margins, positive EBIT growth, strong demand, and normalized operations — still priced like a broken pandemic casualty.

Forward multiples under 6x earnings and under 3x EBITDA are not equilibrium valuation levels for a business performing like this. If travel demand remains fundamentally intact (which current data supports) and the company keeps executing normally — investors don’t need miracles for upside.

They just need the market to stop hallucinating disaster.

This travel giant is priced like a broken leftover.
It isn’t.

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Every once in a while, a company so dominant in its home market trades at a valuation so absurdly low, it forces you to ask: What’s the catch?

PT Indofood Sukses Makmur (IDX: INDF) fits the bill. With a market cap of roughly $3.9 billion, Indofood trades at a P/E ratio of 6 and an EV/EBITDA of 5. That’s bargain territory for a business that touches nearly every Indonesian household.

Indonesia’s Nestlé — but at Basement Valuations

Indofood is the largest packaged food company in Indonesia. It owns legendary brands like Indomie (instant noodles), Indomilk, and Chitato. The company operates across four segments: consumer branded products, agribusiness, flour milling, and nationwide distribution.

This integrated model allows Indofood to control the entire value chain, from palm oil plantations to supermarket shelves. That leads to powerful scale advantages and pricing flexibility—a rarity in emerging markets.

Revenue surpassed $7 billion, and the company generated $639 million in net income, with strong free cash flow and operating margins around 20%.

And yet… the stock trades at a valuation more typical of distressed commodity producers.

A Consumer Staples Powerhouse

Indofood is a rare beast: a dominant staples business in an emerging market with pricing power, vertical integration, and brand strength.

• In instant noodles, Indofood holds over 70% market share.

• Its flour and agribusiness divisions supply both internal production and third parties.

• The distribution arm reaches over 1 million outlets nationwide.

Margins are healthy, and returns on capital are surprisingly robust for such a sprawling operation. ROE hovers around 12%, while ROIC sits near 10% — held back only by conglomerate sprawl.

Management has also been investing in technology upgrades and expanding Indofood’s export footprint, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.

Segment and Geographic Breakdown

While Indofood is expanding globally, its revenue remains heavily concentrated in its domestic market:

• Indonesia (87%): core market, driven by strong brand loyalty and a dominant distribution network.

• Africa & Middle East (7%): growing presence, especially with instant noodles and snacks.

• Other Asian countries (4%): includes exports to neighboring Southeast Asian markets.

• Rest of the world (2%): primarily small-scale exports to the US, Europe, and beyond.

Indofood’s operations are divided into four key business segments, each contributing meaningfully to total revenue. Here’s how 2024 revenue breaks down by segment:

• Consumer Branded Products (63%): includes noodles, snacks, dairy products, and beverages.

• Bogasari (20%): focused on wheat flour and pasta.

• Agribusiness (10%): includes cooking oils, margarine, shortening, and palm-related operations.

• Distribution (6%): responsible for logistics and distribution of Indofood and third-party products.

The takeaway? Indofood is a consumer staples giant with deep roots in Indonesia, strong export exposure, and diversified operations across the entire food value chain.

Why So Cheap?

Part of the reason lies in location. Indonesia isn’t exactly on the radar of Western institutional investors. Add in currency volatility and a conglomerate structure that lacks transparency, and you’ve got a perfect recipe for neglect.

But beneath that surface lies a rock-solid business:

• Net debt is minimal, and cash flows are reliable.

• Brand loyalty is unmatched — Indomie is a cultural icon.

• Distribution reach is unrivaled, serving even the most remote islands.

And this isn’t a low-growth story either. Revenues have grown 8% per year in IDR or 5% per year in USD, even in tough macro environments. The consistent margins are a proof of the company’s pricing power.

Population growth and rising incomes only strengthen the tailwind. Indonesia’s population is expected to keep growing until 2050.

Not only is Indonesia’s population growing, but average income levels are expected to rise significantly as well. As a result, Indonesia is set to become the world’s fourth-largest economy by 2050, just behind the US.

Sum-of-the-Parts Is Worth Far More

One reason for the discount is Indofood’s structure. The company isn’t just a consumer giant — it’s a holding company with major stakes in two publicly traded subsidiaries:

• Indofood CBP (ICBP): Indofood owns 80.5% of ICBP, its consumer branded arm that includes the Indomie brand and other high-margin categories. At current market prices, Indofood’s stake alone is worth over $4.9 billion — more than its entire market cap of $3.9 billion.

• Salim Ivomas Pratama (SIMP): Indofood also holds a majority stake (around 74%) in SIMP, which owns palm oil plantations and agribusiness operations. This adds another $430 million in hidden value, even at depressed palm oil valuations.

That means investors buying INDF today are getting the rest of the group for free:

• Bogasari: This fully owned division handles flour milling and pasta production — a cash-generating backbone with national scale. While unlisted, this segment could conservatively be worth several hundred million dollars on EBITDA multiples alone.

• Distribution & International Operations: Indofood’s logistics arm reaches over 1 million outlets, and its export footprint spans Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Add further value here, plus real estate and other investments.

Even a back-of-the-envelope sum-of-the-parts valuation suggests a discount of at least 40–50%, depending on how conservatively you value the unlisted segments.

At this point, you’re not just betting on earnings growth — you’re buying dollar bills for 50 cents, and getting some upside optionality thrown in for free.

Risks? Of Course. But Are They Priced In?

Indofood isn’t risk-free:

• Commodity prices (especially wheat and palm oil) impact margins.

• Currency fluctuations can hurt imports and dampen earnings in USD terms.

• Conglomerate opacity makes it harder to evaluate capital allocation.

But these risks are well known — and more than baked into the current price.

How Is This Still So Cheap?

Despite dominating Indonesia’s consumer landscape, Indofood trades at a price that makes deep value investors do a double take.

We’re talking about a P/E of just 6, an EV/EBITDA of 45, and a P/OCF of only 3.5 — for a company generating $639 billion in annual profit.

Even crazier: strip out its stakes in Indofood CBP and IndoAgri, and the core business is basically going for peanuts. On a sum-of-the-parts basis, the discount is borderline absurd — even by emerging market standards.

You’re not paying for growth. You’re not paying for optionality. You’re barely paying for the cash flow.

This is deep value in broad daylight.

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Every now and then, a company trades at such absurdly low multiples that you have to look twice to make sure you’re not missing something obvious.

Turkish Airlines (BIST: THYAO), officially known as Türk Hava Yollari Anonim Ortakligi, is one of those rare opportunities hiding in plain sight. A company with $23 billion in annual revenue, robust growth, strong profitability, and global reach—trading at just 3.4× trailing earnings and 3.8× forward earnings.

This isn’t some highly leveraged basket case. It’s one of the world’s largest and most successful airlines.

A global powerhouse in aviation

Turkish Airlines is the national flag carrier of Turkey. It operates flights to over 300 destinations across more than 120 countries—more than any other airline in the world. That global footprint is not just for show; it drives massive network advantages, brand strength, and pricing power in key international markets.

And it’s more than just a passenger airline. The company also operates a fast-growing cargo business, runs its own aircraft maintenance division, invests in airport operations, offers in-flight catering, develops aviation-related software, and even manufactures aircraft interior components.

This level of vertical integration provides Turkish Airlines with more control over its supply chain, better margins, and enhanced resilience in the face of supply disruptions. It also enables cross-business synergies and scale that few competitors can match. In many ways, Turkish Airlines resembles an aviation conglomerate more than a traditional carrier.

Explosive growth meets rock-solid margins

Revenue has grown at a 17% CAGR over the past five years, and analysts expect 23% CAGR over the next two. This is not merely a post-COVID bounce. Turkish Airlines is executing on a long-term strategy of fleet expansion, new route development, and network optimization.

Its fleet now includes over 430 aircraft, and management plans to increase this significantly in the coming years. A younger, more fuel-efficient fleet translates to lower unit costs and higher profitability. Meanwhile, the company is investing in digital transformation to streamline operations and improve customer satisfaction.

Unlike many airlines, Turkish Airlines is consistently profitable. Operating margins remain solid, and free cash flow is strong—even when adjusted for currency effects. Its cargo division has been a major earnings driver, capitalizing on the global boom in air freight. The Miles&Smiles loyalty program continues to gain traction and enhances repeat customer behavior.

A fortress balance sheet in disguise

Despite the stigma that surrounds many emerging market carriers, Turkish Airlines has built a surprisingly solid balance sheet. It has steadily paid down debt over the past several years and actively manages currency exposure.

About 49% of the company is owned by the Turkey Wealth Fund, the country’s sovereign wealth vehicle. While some investors view this as a political risk, it also provides long-term strategic alignment and access to capital. It reinforces Turkish Airlines’ status as a systemically important national asset.

The airline has also invested in training academies, MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) capabilities, and ground services—all of which support vertical integration and long-term cost control.

The valuation is laughable

Let’s break it down:

• Trailing P/E: 3.4

• Forward P/E: 3.8

• Price/Sales: 0.4

• Price/Book: 0.5

These numbers don’t just suggest value—they scream it. Turkish Airlines is being priced like a distressed cyclical in decline. Yet this is a company with a long track record of resilient earnings, system-wide profitability, and increasing global relevance.

The average airline trades at double or triple these multiples. And most of those peers don’t have Turkish Airlines’ international reach, diversified revenue mix, or cost advantages.

What the market fears

Skeptics often cite several recurring themes: currency volatility, macroeconomic instability, geopolitical risk, and state involvement. All are real. The Turkish Lira has been volatile, and Turkey’s political climate adds complexity.

But Turkish Airlines generates most of its revenue in hard currencies, and its costs are increasingly hedged. It’s become better at FX management, and the presence of long-haul routes and international business provides natural diversification.

As for politics, being the national carrier with backing from the Turkey Wealth Fund has given Turkish Airlines strategic stability. It has continued to operate and expand through military coups, recessions, and pandemic-era lockdowns. That resilience should not be underestimated.

Why this opportunity exists

Turkish Airlines is overlooked. It’s listed in Istanbul, denominated in Lira, and lacks widespread analyst coverage. It doesn’t show up on the radar of most Western investors or ETFs. But underneath the geopolitical noise is a cash-generating machine with massive optionality.

This is deep value in the purest sense. A global business trading at 3–4× earnings and growing faster than most developed-market peers. And yet, it remains priced like a subscale regional airline.

Deep value doesn’t always wear the uniform of a declining steel mill or broken REIT. Sometimes it looks like a world-class airline headquartered in Istanbul.

The bottom line

Turkish Airlines isn’t just another airline. It’s a vertically integrated, globally connected, and strategically backed aviation giant.

At 3–4× earnings, it offers one of the most compelling setups in global markets. Investors aren’t just buying earnings—they’re buying scale, resilience, and operating leverage at a deep discount.

You don’t need a rerating for this to work. Just hold, collect, and let the fundamentals compound.

This is deep value at cruising altitude.

— Deep Value Stocks

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Every now and then, a company trades at such a ridiculously low valuation that it makes you do a double take.

China YuHua Education (SEHK: 6169) is one of those anomalies. With a market cap of just $313 million, the stock is valued at only 3.2x earnings. If you subtract the negative net deb — they have a net cash position — you get an enterprise value of $213 million. Thats’s a valuation of just 2.5x earnings! This is borderline absurd, even for a Chinese stock.

A Profitable Education Giant

YuHua is no speculative early-stage company. It’s a mature, consistently profitable private education provider operating across China and Thailand. The company offers kindergarten, primary, secondary, university, and vocational education. It owns and operates 26 schools under the YuHua brand in China and 1 in Thailand and serves tens of thousands of students.

In the last twelve months, YuHua earned $87 million in net income on roughly $360 million in revenue. That means the stock trades at about 3.5x net income, 0.6x EV/sales, and just 2.1x free cash flow.

And this is with a net cash position of around $100 million. With shareholder’s equity totalling $1,163 million, the P/B value is only 0,2.

These aren’t razor-thin margins either. EBITDA margin is a staggering 56%, with net margins near 24%, and free cash flow margins north of 40%.

Why So Cheap?

The discount has little to do with business fundamentals. Instead, it reflects broader macro and regulatory concerns:

• China’s education crackdown in 2021 shocked investors. The government banned for-profit tutoring and imposed restrictions on private education operators.

• Investor sentiment toward China remains poor, especially in sectors seen as vulnerable to policy interference.

• Small cap Hong Kong-listed stocks are out of favor, with limited institutional coverage or liquidity.

However, YuHua operates in a different niche. It’s not an after-school tutoring platform, but a provider of full-time education services. The regulatory headwinds are real, but they hit tutoring companies far harder than licensed schools like YuHua.

An Asset-Light Compounding Machine

YuHua’s model is efficient. It owns and manages schools in second- and third-tier cities where land is cheaper and competition is lower. This allows for:

• High returns on capital: ROE is nearly 15%, ROIC near 10%, despite the dirt-cheap valuation.

• Low capex requirements: The company generates strong cash flow without the need for constant reinvestment.

• Organic and inorganic growth: YuHua continues to expand its footprint through both new school development and acquisitions.

Management has also emphasized digital transformation and vocational offerings, further expanding its addressable market.

Debt? What Debt?

Despite the cheap valuation, YuHua’s balance sheet is pristine. The company has over $182 million in cash and only a small amount of debt, leading to negative net debt of roughly $100 million.

With a debt/equity ratio of just 0.1 and EBIT/interest coverage of 16x, the business is financially bulletproof. There’s ample room for buybacks, dividends, or strategic investments.

Growth at a Bargain Price

Even with investor apathy toward Chinese equities, YuHua continues to grow:

• EPS growth of 35% CAGR over 3 years

• Revenue CAGR of 15% over 10 years, with 3–5% growth in more recent years

With a forward P/E of 2.6, even modest growth could lead to serious upside. If sentiment turns, this stock could easily re-rate toward 6–8x earnings — potentially tripling the current share price.

The Bottom Line

YuHua isn’t flashy. It doesn’t have AI hype, meme stock momentum, or a charismatic CEO on CNBC.

What it does have is this:

• A real, cash-generating business

• Excellent margins and capital efficiency

• A rock-solid balance sheet

• Predictable growth

• And a ridiculous valuation

In deep value investing, that’s the dream setup.

There are risks—especially regulatory and geopolitical—but they seem more than priced in.

If you’re willing to go where others aren’t looking, China YuHua Education might be one of the cheapest value stocks in the world right now.

— Deep Value Stocks

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In August 2022, I bought shares of Heijmans NV – a Dutch construction and real estate development company – at €10.44. Today, the stock trades around €61.75, delivering a 611% total return (approximately 86% CAGR) in just three years. Measured in US dollars the return is even higher: 825% or 95% CAGR! This is not too far from Nvidia’s 943% return during the same time period.

Such a dramatic gain is every deep value investor’s dream. Now, with the stock fully rerated and a large part of the opportunity realized, I’ve decided to sell half my position to lock in profits (while letting the remaining shares ride).

In this article, I’ll explain why Heijmans was so mispriced back then, what has changed since, and why it’s prudent to rebalance after this huge win.

2022: An Extraordinary Deep Value Opportunity

When I initiated the Heijmans position in August 2022, the valuation was absurdly low. The company’s market cap was only about €225 million – less than the €317 million book value of its equity at the time. In other words, Mr. Market was pricing Heijmans at roughly 0.7× book value. Meanwhile, Heijmans had earned around €65 million in net profit over the prior four quarters, putting the P/E at 3.5. A profitable, asset-rich business trading for pennies on the dollar – this was deep value in its purest form.

Why so cheap? In 2022, sentiment toward construction stocks was poor. The sector is cyclical, and the Dutch market faced nitrogen regulation issues, housing policy shifts, and macro headwinds. Rent controls and policy uncertainty scared investors. Add the small-cap status, and Heijmans was simply ignored.

What Changed? From Mispricing to Massive Outperformance

Over the next three years, Heijmans executed superbly. Revenue rose to €2.6 billion in 2024, with EBITDA growing to €199 million (7.7% margin) and net profit hitting €90 million. Net profit during the last 12 months has risen tot €112 million. The company now earns nearly double what it did when I first bought in.

Management emphasized “margin over volume”, and it paid off. In H1 2025, EBITDA margin rose to 8.5%, approaching their 2027 target. Return on capital employed hit 24%, driven by strong execution and an improved project mix.

Strategic acquisitions like Van Wanrooij and Van Gisbergen expanded the land bank and added prefab housing capabilities. Heijmans now has a housing pipeline of 37,000 units, offering scale and visibility.

The balance sheet remains robust: net debt is minimal, solvency is healthy, and cash generation supports both dividends and growth initiatives.

Tailwinds: Housing Crisis, Politics, and Modular Construction

The Dutch housing shortage remains one of the country’s biggest challenges. All major political parties acknowledge the urgency of building more affordable homes. Affordable housing has even been declared as the central theme of the Dutch elections on next week Wednesday after multiple protests in the streets.

Heijmans is ideally positioned to deliver. Their focus on modular construction and integrated area development gives them an edge in cost efficiency and execution speed.

The company also stands to benefit from increasing investment in infrastructure, driven by energy transition, mobility, and climate resilience. The order book of approximately €3.0 billion reflects these secular tailwinds.

That said, political uncertainty still looms. Permitting remains slow, and recent cabinet collapses have added noise to housing policy timelines. Some of this optimism may now be priced in.

Time to Rebalance: Locking In Gains

At €61.75, Heijmans no longer trades at distressed multiples. The P/E has normalized to 15× trailing earnings and 12× forward earnings. The EV/Gross profit has normalized from 0.6 to 4.6. That’s reasonable for a quality compounder, but the deep value gap has closed.

Given this, I’ve sold half my position to secure gains and reduce concentration risk. The remaining shares stay in the portfolio as a free ride on long-term themes.

Heijmans went from an overlooked cyclical to a national champion. That kind of rerating doesn’t happen often. And after a, 825% $ return, it’s time to celebrate — and reallocate. There’s plenty of other fish in the sea.

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— Deep Value Stocks

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Even the best companies can fall out of favor.

After a strong recovery earlier this year, The Trade Desk (TTD) saw its share price slide again in August — from almost $90 back down to $45. The market reacted to news that Amazon would integrate its ad platform with Netflix, fueling fears of tougher competition.

But the sell-off looks exaggerated. Fundamentally, The Trade Desk remains one of the most profitable, innovative, and dominant companies in global advertising technology.

A strong quarter

In its most recent quarter (Q2 2025), The Trade Desk once again exceeded expectations:

• Revenue: $694 million (+19% YoY)

• Operating margin: 17% (+1 pp)

• Adjusted EBITDA margin: 39%

• Non-GAAP EPS: $0.41 (vs. $0.40 expected)

• Customer retention: above 95% for 11 consecutive years

The only disappointment was the guidance: management expects at least 14% revenue growth for Q3, compared to 19% in Q2.

CEO Jeff Green — who still owns about 9% of the shares — emphasized that this slowdown is temporary, mainly reflecting last year’s U.S. election-driven ad spike and tariff-related spending adjustments.

“Programmatic advertising becomes more valuable in uncertain times,” Green said.
“Advertisers want flexibility and transparency — exactly what The Trade Desk provides.”

A durable business model

The Trade Desk operates the world’s leading demand-side platform (DSP), enabling advertisers to buy digital ad space across the open internet.

Unlike Google or Meta, The Trade Desk doesn’t own any media inventory. Its independence makes it the neutral gateway for advertisers who want transparency and objectivity.

CEO Jeff Green often describes it as “the open internet’s answer to the walled gardens.”

That neutrality is a lasting advantage — one that will likely matter even more as privacy rules tighten and advertisers seek alternatives to closed ecosystems.

AI and innovation at the core

The company’s Kokai platform — which integrates AI into every layer of ad buying — already processes more than 75% of ad spend, expected to reach full adoption by year-end. Advertisers using Kokai report 20–40% better performance on average.

Other initiatives such as OpenPath, DealDesk, and OpenSincera strengthen the ecosystem further:

• OpenPath connects advertisers directly to premium publishers, cutting out middlemen.

• DealDesk uses AI to automatically optimize weaker campaigns.

• OpenSincera offers transparency across the ad supply chain, enhancing trust in the open internet.

Taken together, these innovations reinforce The Trade Desk’s leadership position in data-driven advertising.

Financial strength and valuation

The balance sheet remains pristine:

• No debt

• $1.7 billion in cash

• Consistently positive free cash flow

After the recent decline, the valuation looks more reasonable than it has in years:

• 26× forward earnings

• 9× forward sales

These are the lowest multiples since 2018, despite continued double-digit growth and high margins.

Morningstar sees fair value at $63 and rates the stock 4 stars. The consensus analyst target is around $70, implying roughly 40% upside from current levels.

For a company of this quality, that’s rare.

Deep value doesn’t always show up as a single-digit P/E.
Sometimes it means buying exceptional quality at a moment of pessimism — when expectations have fallen faster than fundamentals.
That’s exactly where The Trade Desk is today.

The setup

The Trade Desk remains the clear leader in programmatic advertising, with deep moats in data, scale, and AI capabilities. It’s debt-free, cash-rich, founder-led, and consistently profitable.
The fundamentals haven’t changed — only investor sentiment did.

The Trade Desk is volatile, but for patient investors, volatility can be an advantage.

In April we bought the stock around $45, after it had fallen 67% in just 4 months.

In May we sold around $75, for a profit of more than 70% in just 1 month!

Sometimes is really is that easy!

At around $50, the stock once again offers a compelling entry point for long-term investors. Phoenix Capital has re-entered this position.

The bottom line

• High-quality, founder-led business

• Strong balance sheet and recurring profitability

• Double-digit growth

• Lowest valuation in seven years

This isn’t a broken growth story. It’s a temporary mispricing in one of the world’s best-run ad-tech companies.

When markets forget what quality looks like, opportunities appear.

The Trade Desk may be volatile — but over time, value and quality converge.

— Deep Value Stocks

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Sometimes, value hides in plain sight.
In a market obsessed with AI hype and high-growth stories, one of the most profitable, cash-generating fintechs in the world trades at single-digit multiples of free cash flow.

That company is PayPal Holdings (PYPL).

At today’s price near 69 USD, PayPal trades at a forward P/E of 13.8 and a forward P/FCF ratio of just 9.2 — levels more typical of slow-growing industrials than a global payments leader with over 430 million active accounts. Morningstar estimates a fair value of 94 USD, implying 36% upside, and still calls PayPal’s moat “narrow but durable.”

But the real story isn’t only the valuation. It’s what PayPal is quietly doing with its mountain of cash.

A 20 Billion USD Buyback Engine

PayPal has one of the largest and most aggressive share repurchase programs in corporate America.
The company’s 20 billion USD buyback authorization, approved in 2022, represents roughly 30% of its current market capitalization.

Over the past 12 months alone, PayPal repurchased 9.1% of its shares outstanding — a buyback yield of 9.1%, far higher than Apple, Visa, or Mastercard. Management still has more than 12 billion USD remaining under the current authorization, and with annual free cash flow exceeding 6–7 billion USD, the company can comfortably sustain these repurchases for years to come.

Buybacks of this magnitude do more than shrink the share count. They supercharge earnings per share (EPS) growth, giving long-term investors an ever-larger claim on PayPal’s profits even if revenue grows modestly.

It’s a rare combination: low valuation, high cash generation, and consistent capital returns.

A silent compounding machine

This buyback yield of 9.1% effectively turns PayPal into a compounding machine.
Each year, the denominator (shares outstanding) shrinks, magnifying per-share metrics. Over time, EPS rises faster than earnings — and intrinsic value compounds quietly in the background.

It’s the same math that made Apple and AutoZone legendary compounders — except PayPal trades at a single-digit FCF multiple.

And crucially, the balance sheet supports it: minimal debt, strong cash flow, and a disciplined focus on profitable growth.

The new PayPal under Alex Chriss

When Alex Chriss took over as CEO in late 2023, he inherited a company struggling with post-pandemic fatigue and fierce competition from Apple Pay, Stripe, and Adyen.

His message since then has been clear: “Focus on what’s profitable.”

In the most recent earnings call, Chriss described how PayPal is being reshaped from a simple payments processor into a “dynamic commerce platform.”

Key priorities include:

• Winning checkout through faster, frictionless payment experiences.

• Scaling Venmo from peer-to-peer payments into an everyday shopping tool.

• Driving Braintree profitability, now past its margin reset phase.

• Launching PayPal World, a global wallet platform connecting billions of users across PayPal, Venmo, Mercado Pago, Tenpay Global and India’s UPI.

This is the new PayPal: leaner, more disciplined, and built to thrive even in a slower economy.

The numbers behind the value

Morningstar projects 6% annual revenue growth over the next five years and steady margin improvement of 25 basis points per year as scale effects kick in.
The company now trades at just 2.1× sales — compared to Visa’s 17× and Mastercard’s 16×.

Despite losing eBay as a high-margin partner years ago, PayPal has rebuilt profitability. In Q2 2025, non-GAAP EPS rose 18% year over year, and transaction margin dollars grew 8%.

Those are hardly the metrics of a business in decline.

PayPal’s return on invested capital remains far above its cost of capital — the hallmark of a durable cash compounder.

Why the market is wrong

Investors have been skeptical for two main reasons:

1. Competition — Apple Pay, Alipay, and WeChat Pay dominate their ecosystems.

2. Slower active user growth — account expansion stalled after 2022.

But the fears are overstated. PayPal still processes over 1.7 trillion USD in annual payment volume, enjoys near-90% checkout conversion rates (vs. industry average ~50%), and has embedded relationships with millions of merchants.

Venmo is finally showing traction, with revenue up 20% and total payment volume up 12%, its best performance in three years.

Meanwhile, the company’s massive user base and brand trust remain enormous moats — assets new competitors can’t easily replicate.

Optionality: crypto, AI and beyond

Chriss is quietly positioning PayPal for the next decade of digital commerce.
Recent moves include:

• Acquiring a 40% stake in Binance Japan, signaling deeper entry into crypto.

• Partnering with Google to integrate PayPal’s solutions across its platforms.

• Expanding PYUSD, its U.S. dollar-backed stablecoin, for decentralized finance and cross-border payments.

These are early steps, but they show a willingness to innovate — without sacrificing profitability.

Risks

No investment is without them. PayPal remains exposed to:

• Regulatory risk, especially around crypto and global data security.

• Competition from tech giants with built-in ecosystems.

• Macro headwinds affecting discretionary online spending.

But management has already proven capable of adapting. The company’s scale, brand, and global reach are difficult to replicate — and its financial flexibility is a major buffer.

The bottom line

PayPal today trades at 9× free cash flow, 13.8× forward earnings, and buys back around 9% of its shares every year — under a 20 billion USD repurchase authorization — nearly a third of the current market cap.

That combination is rare — and powerful.

In a market where investors are paying 30–40× earnings for growth stories with no cash flow, PayPal quietly delivers both growth and cash.

The narrative may still be broken, but the business isn’t.

I’ve owned PayPal for quite some time, but recently increased my position significantly. Anything below 75 USD looks extremely attractive to me — and below 70 USD feels like a genuine bargain.

Markets can stay blind to value for a while. That’s fine. Compounding prefers silence.

— Deep Value Stocks

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Every now and then, a stock comes along that feels like a textbook case of market inefficiency. It trades quietly, under the radar, with little attention from institutions. The market cap is tiny, the liquidity thin. Most investors don’t even know it exists.

And then — almost out of nowhere — a deal is announced that dwarfs the company’s entire valuation. A deal that, if completed, would hand shareholders a windfall far larger than the business is priced for today.

That’s the exact setup we’re looking at here.

We have a junior lithium explorer, listed in Canada, worth just $73 million at today’s share price. It carries no debt. Yet it is now in the final stretch of closing a transaction worth $180 million in cash.

Let that sink in: a company trading at a fraction of the potential cash it might soon hold.

And here’s the kicker: instead of rallying, the stock dropped 14% yesterday.

The deal in Argentina

The company is Lithium Chile, a junior miner with projects across the lithium triangle in Argentina and Chile.

The asset in question is the Arizaro lithium project in Argentina, part of one of the most lithium-rich regions in the world. Arizaro has drawn buyer interest for years, and now a sale looks closer than ever.

According to the latest corporate update, the transaction is essentially ready. All major commercial terms are agreed upon, both parties want to close, and the draft deal has already been sent to the TSX Venture Exchange for regulatory review. The buyer also needs approval from its own local regulator.

In other words: we’re down to the final details. If it all goes through, Lithium Chile will receive $180 million.

That’s more than 2.5x the current market capitalization.

Why the sell-off?

If everything sounds so good, why did the stock crater?

Because in the same breath as the positive news, management announced a C$5 million financing at C$0.50 per share. That’s a mere 5% dilution — insignificant next to the potential deal proceeds — but it spooked the market. Short-term traders bailed, pushing the stock down 14% in a day.

This is a classic case of technical pressure masking fundamental upside. The company needed a bit of working capital to keep operations running while waiting for the deal to close. Rationally, that should not change the long-term story. But markets rarely react rationally in the short term.

The math

Let’s break it down:

• Market cap today: $73 million

• Debt: zero

• Cash proceeds from deal (if closed): $180 million

• Net cash post-deal (ignoring minor dilution): well over 2x current market value

• Enterprise Value post-deal: essentially negative, since the company would have more cash than market cap

And here’s the kicker: Arizaro is only one of the company’s 15 projects. According to some analysts, it’s not even the most valuable one. That means the $180 million is effectively being unlocked from just a fraction of their portfolio.

The payout potential

Management has already stated that the majority of the proceeds from the Arizaro deal would be returned to shareholders. Some analysts even speculate the company could pay out a 100% dividend.

That means investors aren’t just betting on future growth. They could be looking at an immediate cash return that matches or even exceeds the current share price.

What could go wrong?

Here’s the big caveat: the deal is not yet closed.

• The TSX Venture Exchange still needs to provide its feedback.

• The buyer’s local regulator must also give official approval.

• Governments could still object — especially the Canadian side, which has the power to delay or even block transactions involving strategic resources.

Until all signatures are in place, nothing is guaranteed. And that’s exactly why the market is skeptical: the stock is priced as if the probability of failure is high.

However, management has also pointed out that solutions exist if Canada were to block the deal. One of those options is relocating the company’s corporate headquarters to another jurisdiction, outside Canada’s reach. That flexibility reduces the risk of a total deal collapse and keeps the door open for the transaction — even if politics get in the way.

Bigger picture: why lithium matters

It’s also worth remembering the broader backdrop. Lithium prices have come down from their 2021–2022 peaks, which left many explorers and developers scrambling for capital. That makes cash in the bank worth more than ever.

If this company locks in $180 million, it will have the flexibility to fund operations, advance its other projects, or return capital to shareholders. And with 14 other properties still in the portfolio, investors are not just buying optionality on a single mine — but exposure to an entire pipeline of assets across the lithium triangle.

Bottom line

• A $73 million stock on the verge of a $180 million payday.

• Zero debt, making the cash proceeds even more impactful.

• Arizaro is just one of 15 projects — and not necessarily the crown jewel.

• Management has said most of the cash will go back to shareholders, with some speculating about a full 100% dividend.

• A 14% sell-off caused by a small financing, not by fundamentals.

• But: regulators could still delay or block the deal. Until the ink is dry, the risk is real.

For deep value investors, this is the kind of asymmetric bet worth paying attention to. If the deal closes, the rerating could be swift — and the dividend could be extraordinary.

I put my money where my mouth is. I’m convinced enough that I doubled my position today.

Sometimes, a stock gets hit for the right reasons.
Sometimes, the sell-off is justified.

But every now and then, the market just straight-up misprices reality.

What I’m about to show you is a large-cap company, with $140+ billion in annual revenue, a critical role in the U.S. healthcare system, and tens of millions of customers.

It’s not speculative.
It’s not loss-making.
It’s not cyclical.

And yet — since January, the stock is down 62%.
That's not a correction. That’s a meltdown.

And today, it trades at just 4.3x earnings.

So what does this company actually do?

It’s one of the largest players in the managed care sector — basically, it helps administer health insurance programs for governments and individuals across the U.S.

The company runs massive contracts for Medicaid, Medicare Advantage, and ACA (Obamacare) plans.
If you're low-income, disabled, or buying individual insurance on the exchange, there’s a good chance this company is involved.

It’s not a household name. But its footprint is huge: over 28 million members.

So what went wrong?

The warning shot that broke the chart

In July, the company withdrew its 2025 guidance — never a good headline.
The reason?
They had completely miscalculated enrollment dynamics in the ACA markets.

In 22 out of 29 states, new signups were lower than expected, and the risk pool was worse — meaning sicker, costlier patients. That throws off a critical financial lever: risk adjustment payments from the government.

They now expect a $1.8 billion shortfall in those payments, which will hit 2025 profits hard.

EPS expectations dropped from over $7 to around $1.75.

The market didn’t just flinch.
It panicked.
Shares collapsed.

And that’s where it gets interesting

Even with the cut, the company is still profitable. Still serving 28 million members. Still running massive contracts.

And based on trailing earnings — yes, TTM — the stock now trades at just 4.3x 2024 net income.

Let’s be clear: that multiple will go up if earnings stay lower for a while.
Forward P/E? Closer to 20, based on revised expectations.

But that’s the point.
The market is treating this like a broken business, not a temporary stumble.

Which brings us to the company in question:

Centene Corporation (NYSE: CNC)

What the market is missing

Centene didn’t commit fraud. It didn’t lose core contracts. It didn’t run out of cash.

It just misjudged a complex, government-heavy part of its business — and adjusted expectations accordingly.

But the market went way beyond that. It priced in permanent damage, even though:

• Medicaid and Medicare contracts remain intact

• The ACA enrollment issues are being addressed

• The company remains cash-flow positive

• And long-term tailwinds (aging population, expanding coverage) haven’t gone away

This is not a busted model. It’s a rerating gone nuclear.

Why I bought

At 4.3x trailing earnings, you don’t need explosive growth to win.
You just need things to not get worse.

If EPS rebounds in 2026 or 2027, the current price could look ridiculous.
Even if it doesn’t, this might still be too cheap for what it is: a cash-flowing, system-critical operator trading like a cyclical mess.

I hear you thinking: “But they pulled guidance — isn’t that a red flag?”
Sure, it is. But red flags don’t always mean red ink.
Sometimes, they mean opportunity.

The stock is down 62%.
The business is not.

That’s deep value.

Dig deeper,
Deep Value Stocks

Sometimes, a stock is so cheap you double-check the numbers three times.

Imagine this:

• A company with 80% gross margins

• 45% net margins

• 35% return on equity

• Zero debt

• And over half a billion dollars in cash

And yet… it trades at just 3.5x EV/EBIT.

It gets even better: EV/net income? Just 2.1x.
Yes, that’s actual net income.

Still wondering which company this is?

The Setup

Let’s do the math:

• Market cap: $891 million

• Net cash: $507 million

• → Enterprise value: $384 million

• 2024 net income: ~$184 million
  → EV/net income = 2.1x

This isn’t a melting ice cube or a speculative story stock.
It’s a profitable, operationally efficient business — and the market is ignoring it.

So what’s going on?

What’s holding it back

Growth has slowed — and the market hates that.

Revenue dropped from $492 million in 2023 to $395 million in 2024.
2025? Flat. Q1 was already weak. Not the best start.

The U.S. market shrank from 65% down to 50%.
Economic pressure. Less demand from aesthetic clinics.
And then came new tariffs on Israeli-made products. That didn’t help margins.

Europe and Asia are doing okay — but not great.
They’re growing, but at lower profitability.

The result?
Falling sales. Shrinking margins. Nervous investors.

Which brings us to the company in question:
InMode (NASDAQ: INMD)

Maybe you’ve looked at it before. Maybe you moved on.

But at 2.1x net income? You might want to look again.

What’s under the hood

This isn’t just a cosmetic gadget play.

InMode sells RF-based medical devices used for things like skin tightening, fat reduction, and facial rejuvenation — high-margin, cash-pay procedures offered by plastic surgeons and dermatologists.

But they’re expanding into real medical markets too: incontinence, vaginal health, sleep apnea, erectile dysfunction, and more.

The first new platform could launch late 2025. Others will take longer and require FDA approval.

The idea? Combine aesthetic treatments with reimbursed clinical indications — and open up new revenue streams without giving up profitability.

And with $500M in cash and no debt, they’ve got the runway to make it happen.

Capital allocation? Aggressive.

InMode has already bought back 30% of its shares in the past two years — over $500 million returned to shareholders.

They may step it up again in 2026 (pending U.S. tax changes).
Or pursue M&A — prior deals didn’t happen because management wouldn’t overpay.

Activists are circling. Management is cautious but firm.

Why I’m buying

At 2.1x EV/net income, you don’t need a growth story.
You just need the business to stay alive. If growth comes back? That’s a bonus.

You're getting:

• High margins

• Strong balance sheet

• A pipeline of optionality

• Massive buybacks

• And a valuation that doesn’t make sense

I hear you thinking: “There must be a catch.”
Sure — sentiment is weak. But the numbers don’t lie.

This is deep value. And it won’t stay that way forever.

Dig deeper,
Deep Value Stocks

Every now and then, you stumble on something that makes you stop and think: Wait... why is no one talking about this? How is this possible?

That’s exactly what happened when I came across this stock. This is one of those ultra-under-the-radar names that somehow slipped through the cracks — but not anymore.

Here’s the deal.

A Hidden Gem in the Lithium Triangle

Lithium Chile (TSXV: LITH) is a small Canadian exploration company with lithium projects in Argentina and Chile. On April 9, 2025, they signed a binding letter of intent to sell 80% of their flagship asset — the Salar de Arizaro project — for $180 million.

To put that in perspective: the company’s entire market cap is only about $90 million.

Yes — they’re selling one asset for twice the value of the entire company.

I hear you thinking: “They must be drowning in debt.” But nope — Lithium Chile is debt-free and actually holds a net cash position of around $1 million.

And yet? Crickets.

A Massive Special Dividend?

If the deal goes through (pending final agreement, shareholder approval, and regulatory clearance), there's a very real chance shareholders could receive a special dividend of around C$0.50 per share — at a time when the stock is trading around C$0.60.

You read that right. That’s potentially 80% of your money back in cash, and you still own the rest of the company.

And here's what you still get to keep:

• A 20% stake in Arizaro

• 89% ownership of an adjacent block (Block IV)

• The Salar de Coipasa project in Chile (with a resource estimate of 3.7 million tonnes LCE)

• 12 other early-stage lithium projects

• And potentially a significant cash position post-sale

According to some analysts, the Salar de Arazar project for which the company received a $180 million bid is not eve

n their most valuable project!

So Why the Discount?

Simple: the market doesn’t believe it yet.

The deal isn’t finalized, and lithium prices have been in the dumps lately. That’s keeping sentiment — and the stock price — depressed. Investors are waiting on certainty. But while they wait, the upside is staring us right in the face.

Another wildcard: the rumored buyer of the Arizaro stake is most likely Chinese. Canada has been increasingly protective of its critical minerals sector, especially when Chinese state-linked capital is involved. There’s a risk regulators block the deal.

But here’s the thing — there are workarounds. Lithium Chile could simply relocate its headquarters to avoid Canadian jurisdiction. That’s not theory — it’s been done before. And if the deal falls through? The company still owns a world-class asset it could develop or sell elsewhere.

My Thesis

This is a classic deep value setup. One project is worth more than the whole company. You're potentially getting a giant cash return plus ongoing upside in multiple high-quality lithium assets.

And no one’s paying attention.

I found this idea myself — not from a newsletter, not from a tip, just from digging through small-cap miners and looking where no one else was looking.

The best part? The market hasn't woken up yet. But it will.

Until then, this stock might just be the most overlooked lithium play out there.

Stay contrarian,
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